highly automated warehouses instead of a network of physical stores. Over time, it pivoted into a technology business, selling its “customer fulfilment centre” (CFC) robotics and software to traditional grocers such as Kroger in the US, Sobeys in Canada and Coles in Australia. In Britain, Ocado Retail is now a joint venture with Marks & Spencer, created in 2019 when M&S took a £750 million stake, and Ocado switched from selling Waitrose products to M&S’s own‑label lines. That deal was meant to stabilise the consumer-facing side while the group chased higher-margin growth in licensing its technology abroad. The numbers: huge funding, stubborn losses Investors have poured more than £5.5 billion into Ocado over its life via equity and debt, a sum now approaching three times its current market value. Yet the group has amassed around £1.8 billion in losses since its 2010 listing, and even in its most recent full year, it reported a pre-tax loss of about £374–375 million despite revenue growth of roughly 14 per cent to over £3.1–3.2 billion. But there are bright spots: Ocado Retail’s underlying profit has risen, and weekly orders and active customers are growing. But a critical technology payment from M&S has been written down to zero after performance targets were missed, underlining how fragile the economics remain. Job cuts and cost discipline Against this backdrop, Ocado is now preparing another round of belt‑tightening. Up to 1000 roles – about 5 per cent of its global workforce – are reportedly at risk, with an announcement expected as soon as this month. Most of the cuts are likely to fall on its UK head office, among those working in technology and back‑office teams such as legal, finance, and HR.​ The company has not confirmed specific numbers, saying only that it “regularly reviews” operations to ensure it is set up for “long‑term success” and that, if decisions affecting staff are made, people will be informed directly and supported. The goal is to deliver on a long‑stated ambition to move into sustained positive cash flow in the 2025 to 2026 financial year. Why exclusivity ending matters A key strategic shift is the expiry of exclusivity clauses in many of Ocado’s international contracts. Historically, partners such as Kroger had rights to Ocado’s robotic fulfilment tech in defined territories, limiting Ocado’s ability to sell to rival grocers in those markets. Those terms have now lapsed in most countries outside the UK, which means Ocado can, in theory, sign multiple retailers in each region and leverage its intellectual property more effectively. Steiner has framed this as an opportunity to bring Ocado’s full suite of AI‑powered and robotic solutions “back to multiple markets” and unlock new commercial activity. Ocado’s ongoing partnership with Coles in Australia offers one of the clearest tests of that model in a fast‑growing online grocery market. The two companies signed a deal in 2019, and in 2024, Coles switched on Ocado‑powered customer fulfilment centres in Melbourne and Sydney that use armies of robots and AI to pick and pack online orders, promising fresher products, a wider range and extended delivery windows from 5am to 10pm for metropolitan shoppers. Coles executives have hailed the Truganina facility in Victoria and its Sydney counterpart as a “step change” in their e-commerce offer. At the same time, analysts say the Ocado platform is already helping Coles gain online market share and easing pressure on stores at peak times – a rare example of Ocado’s technology clearly reinforcing a major supermarket’s core business. The big question: vision versus reality Ocado’s pitch has always been that its automation can make online grocery structurally more efficient than store‑based picking, justifying years of investment and losses. The challenge is that rivals like Instacart and DoorDash have grown quickly with less capital-intensive models, while some flagship partners, including Kroger, have slowed or scaled back their roll-outs and even closed several automated sites. That leaves Ocado at a crossroads: leaner, with more freedom to sell its tech, but still needing to prove that the “Tesla of grocery” is a scalable, profitable platform rather than a brilliant but perennially loss‑making experiment.